As a brief introduction, New York law allows the licensing officer (in Nassau, Suffolk and NY City this would be the police commissioner) wide discretion to approve or reject an application for a pistol license or to cancel an existing license. If a person is aggrieved by the decision, he can appeal it to a Supreme Court Judge. Once the matter comes before the Judge the decision of the Police Commissioner is nearly always upheld, as the Judge may only reverse the decision if it is arbitrary and capricious, i.e. not based on any facts that would suggest that the applicant is unsuitable for the license.
In Fauntleroy, the applicant had previously held a pistol license which was revoked by the Police Commissioner. In July 1996, Fauntleroy was advised by police officers that someone was trying to break into his basement. Believing that his family was in danger, Fauntleroy fired several shots from his window in order to scare away the intruder. The shots were fired at the base of a tree which was on his property. Fauntleroy was arrested for reckless endangerment, but the charge was dismissed. (The intruder was convicted on the burglary charge).
Following the incident, the police department conducted an investigation which culminated in an offer that Fauntleroy agree to a six month suspension of the existing license, to be followed by a 1 year probation period. Fauntleroy disagreed and went to a hearing at which time the hearing officer recommended that he be permitted to keep his license. The commanding officer of the licensing division did not follow the recommendation and suspended Fauntleroy's license for shooting at a fleeing felon. Fauntleroy did not appeal the decision.
Approximately one year later, Fauntleroy filed a new application for a license. This was denied by the police, based on the 1997 revocation of the license. Fauntleroy challenged the denial, but the trial court and ultimately the appellate division upheld the commissioner's ability to deny the application based on the revocation less than two years prior.
In 2003, Fauntleroy filed another application which was rejected by the police. In so doing, the police informed him that “Due to the revocation of your pistol license, you are prohibit [sic] to possess a firearm as per Penal Law section 400(1)(e) [sic], 400.00(1)(e).”
Fauntleroy appealed the decision by filing an Article 78 petition challenging the denial as arbitrary, capricious and affected by errors of law. In discussing the standard of law to be applied, the court explained:
An application for a renewal is treated in the same manner as an application for a new license, and the inquiry of the court is limited to a determination of whether the record discloses circumstances which leave no possible scope for the reasonable exercise of that discretion. However, in an Article 78 proceeding, the reviewing court is not expected to act as a mere rubber stamp, but, rather, exercises a genuine judicial function and does not confirm a determination simply because it was rendered by an administrative agency. Here,the record shows that the sole basis for denial of petitioner's 2003 pistollicense application was that Respondent felt that Penal Law § 400.00(1)(e)mandated such result because of the prior revocation of his pistol license.
does not, contrary to the position apparently taken by respondent in denying petitioner's most recent application, make any prior revocation of a pistol permit for any reason whatsoever an automatic bar to the issuance of a permit,but, rather only makes such a bar mandatory where the prior revocation was due to the issuance of a temporary or permanent order of protection pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 530.14 or Family Court Act § 842-a. It is clear that the lifetime revocation of firearms license privileges referred to in Penal Law § 400.00(1)(e) applies only to a person who has had a license revoked because of the issuance of a temporary or permanent order of protection to protect against acts of domestic violence. It is undisputed that no such order of protection was ever sought, let alone issued, against petitioner. Therefore, respondent's determination was affected by an error of law.
Since the decision was based on an error of law, the court remanded the matter back to the police department to reconsider its decision. Prior to doing so, the court noted that:
it has now been seven years since petitioner's earlier permit was revoked. Nothing has been submitted to question petitioner's good conduct or good character in the intervening seven years. This factor should be taken into account in the reconsideration of the application. If this factor is not considered, then respondent is effectively arguing that every revocation is a permanent revocation. The court has not been cited to any such rule.
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