Wednesday, February 18, 2009

Wednesday's Weird But True Legal Cases - Vol XLII

This week's weird (but true) legal case looks at the matter of Badgley v. City of New York, 606 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1979) a case with a very intriguing fact pattern.

In Badgley, multiple suits filed by Pennsylvania landowners were consolidated for a joint trial against the City of New York. The basis for the suits was that the City's diversion of water from the Delaware River had diminished the value of their properties which were situated along the Delaware River. After the District Court granted judgment to the property owners, the City appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. This post will discuss the Second Circuit's reversal of the District Court decision.

Before getting into the decision itself, I need to explain one of the reasons that this case appealed to me. Leaving aside the intriguing arguments mentioned in the decision, I have a personal involvement in the sense that I recall numerous summer canoe trips down the Delaware River where it adjoins New York on one side and Pennsylvania on the other. The decision itself talks about how the Eastern and Western branches join at Hancock, New York and that prior to the confluence of the branches, the Western branch passes Deposit, New York where it abuts both New York and Pennsylvania.

In arguing that the lower court decision was incorrect, the City of New York leaned heavily on the argument that the landowners were preempted from suit because of a prior settlement in a lawsuit involving the states of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. While most people know that the Supreme Court of the United States is the highest court in the land, it is generally thought of as an appeals court of last resort which reviews the decisions of lower state and federal courts. However, the Supreme Court also has the jurisdiction to hear lawsuits between the states themselves. I can recall a suit in the not too distant past when New York and New Jersey were arguing as to which state actually owned Liberty Island in New York harbor.

As was relevant to the Badgley lawsuit, in 1929 New York City announced that it was planning to divert water from the Delaware River to provide for the City's drinking water supply. Thereafter, New Jersey filed suit in the Supreme Court of the United States, seeking to block the diversion. Soon after, the State of Pennsylvania intervened to protect the supply of water to Philadelphia and Eastern Pennsylvania. After a considerable amount of testimony, a report was prepared by a special referee which was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in 1931. The decree limited the amount of water New York City could divert, while requiring that water be released by New York and New Jersey at regular intervals so as to protect downstream states from damages to municipal, recreational and fishery uses. Thereafter, in 1954 the decree was modified on consent of all states. Later in 1962 the four basin states entered into an agreement to create the Delaware River Basin Commission.

In reversing the lower court, the Second Circuit found that the Pennsylvania landowners could not bring suit because the prior lawsuit filed by the State of Pennsylvania had been filed as Parens patriae since Pennsylvania had been acting on behalf of all the citizens of the State of Pennsylvania. In so doing, the Circuit noted that "a suit may be brought by a state 'for an injury to it in its capacity of Quasi -sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.'"

An interesting side note is that while the property owners tried to argue that they had independent rights, the court disagreed, explaining that:
[A]ppellees are correct in asserting that Pennsylvania could not have brought suit or intervened in the suit against New York to protect a mere collectivity of private riparian rights. But to draw from this the conclusion that the individual interests of Pennsylvania's riparian owners were not represented in the suit and are thus not affected by the Decree is to ignore the obvious fact that the riparian rights of the appellees are not independent of Pennsylvania's rights in the waters of the Delaware River but rather are derivative therefrom and are subject to change by the laws of that state. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670, 51 S.Ct. 286, 75 L.Ed. 602 (1931). Thus, it necessarily follows that the rights of Pennsylvania citizens cannot exceed those of Pennsylvania itself and the extent of Pennsylvania's rights in the Delaware River was conclusively determined by the terms of the Decree.
If you have seen this post being carried on another site such as JBlog, please feel free to click here to find other articles on the kosherbeers blogsite. Hey its free and you can push my counter numbers up!

No comments: